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I.

INTRODUCTION

Although less than forty years have passed since the founding of
the European Economic Community (now the European Community), 1
the lifetime of the Community is well marked temporally. The term of
each Commission 2 furnishes a convenient time-line for measuring the
Community's progress in legal integration. Since the 1970s, each year
has been punctuated by two or more "summit" meetings of heads of state
or government. 3 These summits not only are key markings in their own
right, but also furnish an occasion for additional monitoring of the
Community's state of health. Throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s,
*
Charles Keller Beekman Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. This
Article was adapted from a lecture presented at the Eason-Weinmann Colloquium on International
and Comparative Law at Tulane Law School in November 1994.
1. Article G(l) of the TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992 [hereinafter
MAAsmcHT TREATY] replaces the term "European Economic Community" with the term

"European Community" throughout the

TREATY ESTABLiSHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC

Mar. 25, 1957 [hereinafter EC TEATY]. The European Community now represents
one of the pillars of the European Union; the latter is described in Article A of the MAASrcrrr
TRATv as "founded on the European Communities, supplemented by the policies and forms of
cooperation established by this Treaty." Id art. A.
2.
Art. 158 of the EC TREATY, supra note 1, as amended by the MAAsTmcrrr TREATY,
supra note 1, art. 11, provides that the Commission shall have a five-year term. The term of the
present Commission began in January 1995.
3.
Art. 2 of the SINGLE EUROPEAN Acr, effective July 1, 1987, provides that the European
Council "shall bring together the Heads of State or of Government of the Member States and the
President of the Commission of the European Communities," and "shall meet at least twice a year."
Co

urIsnxY,
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the Community submitted to periodic "self-examinations" through
specially commissioned studies and reports on the Community's wellbeing.4 In more recent years, intergovernmental conferences (IGCs),
convened for the express purpose of negotiating amendments to the
constitutive treaties, have provided additional fora for deliberately and
5
comprehensively assessing the state of the Community and its direction.
While the Community continues to fulfill its geographical "manifest
destiny" through successive enlargements within the European continent,
it provokes a considerable amount of interest in the effect that each
6
particular "widening" has on the Community's overall "deepening."
The Community has thus acquired a strong habit of taking its own
measurements, and even its own temperature. Of course, the Community
is a good candidate for such treatment since it is, after all, an enterprise
and, like most enterprises, has its more or less well-defined criteria of
success and failure. Unlike other polities, it seems never to have had the
luxury of just surviving-that is to say, of merely meeting its
population's basic needs and avoiding internal and external threats to
security. It has always had, and continues to have, a positive program to
accomplish. Moreover, the Community has continually had to justify
itself nearly every step along the way, since its very mission implies a
challenge to the political and legal autonomy of some nations with a welldeveloped sense of sovereignty. Finally, the Community has been subject
from the start to intense scrutiny by the well-established academic
communities-legal, economic, and political-within each of the
Member States.
My aim is neither to recount the results of the European
Community's self-examinations over the last forty years, nor make a
parallel inquiry into the United States. These forty years have brought
changes not only in the Community and the United States, viewed
4. For a brief discussion, see GEORGE A. BERMA,, Er AL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EURoPEAN CoMMunrrY LAW 13-14 (1992).
5.
The two most recent rounds of amendments to the EC TREATY, supra note 2, embodied
in the SiNGLE EUROPEAN ACr, supra note 3, and the MAASrRICIr TREATY, supra note 1, were
negotiated at intergovemmental conferences [hereinafter IGCs], convened in 1985 and 1990,
respectively. IGCs for these purposes were originally provided for by the EC TREATY, supra note
1, art. 236, and are now provided for by the MAAsrRicrr TREATY, supra note 1, art. N. The
MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra note 1, art. N, also specifically provides for the convening of an IGC
during 1996 for purposes offurther amendments to the constitutive treaties.
6.
See generallyJohn Redmond, The Future Enlargement of the European Community, 9
ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 149 (1990).
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separately, but also in the common understanding of the Community
within the United States, and vice versa. This Article addresses the
question of changing U.S. perspectives on EC law, with particular focus
given to nontransactional developments. It is curious (though, for the
reasons I suggested above, perhaps not surprising) that we know a great
deal about the European Community's changing legal and political selfassessments over time, but rather little about how the U.S. legal
conception of the Community has itself changed during that period. In
other words, we probably understand the reception of European law in the
European legal community better than we understand its reception in our
own.
The altered reception of EC law in the United States is actually a
question to which I have recently paid considerable attention. It is not, of
course, very surprising that one who is devoted to understanding
American conceptions of EC law would find the changing American
perspective on EC law to be of interest. However, during my recent stay
at the Legal Service of the European Commission, I found myself
continually testing the prevailing U.S. conceptions of EC law. Whichever
meeting I attended or whatever conversation I had, the dominant U.S.
perspectives on EC law were always poignant.
In these remarks, I envisage the notion of the American reception
of European Community law in the most common "telecommunications"
sense of the term. I seek to discuss not so much the "picture" or "image"
of EC law received in the United States as the "wavelengths" on which
that picture or image is received. I simply ask whether the nature of the
interest in the European Community within the American legal
community has changed significantly over the last forty years and, if so,
how and why?
The aspect of EC law that seemed to hold the greatest interest for
Americans throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and into the 1980s, was very
largely a transactional one. By the European Community's transactional
aspect, I mean the impact of EC law on the shape and conduct of discrete
legal transactions. Those transactions include, first and foremost, the
private business dealings of U.S. enterprises with European enterprises or
otherwise those affecting the European market. Transactions also include
the processes by which private law claims arising out of such business
dealings are resolved legally. Even the handling of state-to-state
international trade disputes relative to those dealings may be considered a
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transactional event. It is no exaggeration to suggest that American
scholars of EC law were highly absorbed in the early years in the
transactional impact of that law in all these senses. Their attention was
drawn, significantly enough, to the competition law of the Common
Market, 7 to the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments, 8 and to direct bilateral trade relations between the
United States and the European Community, 9 to name only a few of the
more salient subjects of interest.
Of course, matters were never quite that simple. Competition
law, transnational litigation, and international trade were at no time the
only EC law areas of interest to the U.S. academic community. Eric
Stein, the most eminent U.S. scholar of EC law in those years,
consistently displayed a broader appreciation of Community law than the
listing of those fields would suggest. 10 The transactional perspective on
EC law has not been left behind since. United States and world
economists alike would be rightly dismayed at any suggestion that the
1990s represent a post-transactional world. However, if the needs for
counseling in international transactions may have defined the traditional

7.
The principles of competition law of the European Community are set out in the EC
TREATY, supranote 1, arts. 85 and 86, and in secondary legislation. See generally David J. Gerber,
The Transformation of European Community Competition Law, 35 HARv. INr'L L.J. 97 (1994);
John Temple Lang European Community Competition Law and Member State Action, 10 N.W. J.
INT'LL. & Bus. 114 (1989); Pierre Pescatore, Public and PrivateAspects of European Community
CompetitionLaw, 10 FORDHAM INT'LL.J. 373 (1987); Peter D. Sutherland, The Competition Policy
ofthe European Community, 30 ST. Louis U. L.J. 149 (1985).
8.
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters (Sept. 27, 1968, as amended), 1978 OJ. (L 304) 77, as contemplated by the EC TREATY,
supra note 1, art. 220. See generally Richard G. Fentiman, Jurisdiction, Discretion and the
Brussels Convention, 26 CORNEL INr'L LJ. 59 (1993); Christian Kohler, PracticalExperience of
the Brussels Jurisdictionand Judgments Convention in the Six Original Contracting States, 34
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 563 (1985); Robert Rowland, The Recognition of Judgments in the European
Community, 14 MICH. J. INT'LL. 559 (1993).
9.
For a brief discussion, see BnMAANN, supra note 4, at 952-61. See also Mark L. Jones,
The GA7T-MTN System and the European Community as International Frameworksfor the
Regulation of EconomicActivity, 8 MD. J. INT'LL. & TRADE 53 (1984); Randy E. Miller & Jessica
A. Wasserman, Trade Relations between the European Community and the United States: An
Overview of CurrentIssues and Trade Policy Institutions, 15 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. Ry. 393
(1992).
10.

See, e.g., COURTS AND FREE MARKErS: PERSPECrVES FROM THE UNITED STATEs AND

EuROPE (Terence Sandalow & Eric Stein, eds. 1982); Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges and the Making
ofa TransnationalConstitution, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1981); Eric Stein, Uniforityand Diversity
in a Divided-PowerSystem: The UnitedStates' Experience,61 WASH. L. REv. 1081 (1986).
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interest of American jurists in EC law, it would be difficult to maintain
that view today.
What features are now competing with European Community
law's transactional aspects for the attention of the American audience? In
other words, in what respects has EC law come to assume a
nontransactional significance for us? I suggest that recently Community
law has: (1) fostered a remarkable renewal of interest in the problems of
American federalism, (2) provided an unparalleled frame of reference for
evaluating U.S. law reform proposals more generally, and (3) introduced
unprecedented opportunities for U.S. public authorities to engage in
bilateral regulatory cooperation with overseas counterparts. My purpose
in this Article is to trace briefly each of these nontransactional
developments in the U.S.-EC legal relationship.
II.

FEDERALISM: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN

Questions of federalism, though never absent from the American
constitutional scene, have enjoyed a special prominence in the United
States in very recent times, and seem unlikely to lose that prominence in
the near future. Even before the rise of the so-called "new Republican
majority" in Congress, 11 the U.S. Supreme Court had evidenced its
intention to take federalism more seriously than it had become
accustomed to taking it in recent decades. No decision better exemplifies
the Court's current concern with federalism than its ruling in the case of
New York v. United States.12 In that case, the Court suggested that
principles of federalism captured in the Tenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, and even more basic notions of representative
democracy, prohibit Congress from enacting legislation that compels the
states to enact legislation over their objection, or from otherwise
"commandeering" state resources. 13 The Court's ruling followed, and
partly relied upon, a body of academic writing and public advocacy in
favor of curbing Congress' and the federal agencies' right to dictate state
and local government policy. 14 The Court's more recent ruling in the
11. See Helen Dewar & Kenneth J. Cooper, GOP Senators Want to Cut 100 Programs,
WASH. PosT, Jan. 4, 1995, at Al; David E. Rosenbaum, G.O.P. FacingSome ObstaclesAfter Fast
Start,N.Y. Tws, Feb. 13, 1995, at Al.
12. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
13. Id. at 176.
14. For academic writings, see, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Some New World Lessons for the
Old World, 58 U. CFH. L. REV. 483 (1991); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the
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constitutional challenge to the Federal Gun-Free School Zone Act as in
excess of the limits of federal prescriptive jurisdiction under the Interstate
Commerce Clause 1 5 further limits Congress' power to legislate in areas
16
or in ways traditionally reserved to the states.
Various legislative and constitutional initiatives in the current
U.S. Congress show that Congress is not waiting for the courts to tell it
how far it may go in shaping the agendas of state and local governments.
Whether it is the constitutional requirement of a balanced federal budget,
or legislative limits on the issuance to the States of unfunded federal
mandates, or a more general requirement of strict cost-benefit analyses in
support of federal regulations, each of these initiatives aims at lowering
the federal government's involvement in the shaping of public policy
with a commensurate empowering of the states and their localities. 17
I am not suggesting, of course, that the revival of U.S. judicial or
political interest in federalism issues is in any substantial sense traceable
to EC influence. Still, the European Community presents the U.S.
judiciary and U.S. political institutions with their first real opportunity to
examine the operations of federalism in an overseas setting that is both of
comparable scale and complexity to the United States and shares with it
the same basic political, economic, and cultural values. We know that at
least some of our Supreme Court Justices are aware of, and quite
interested in, the contemporary European federal experience. 18 However
imperfect the U.S.-EC comparison, it is significant for those now thinking
seriously about federalism in the United States that the European
Founders'Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1484 (1987); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guaranty Clause
and State Autonomy: Federalismfor a Third Century, 88 CoLuM. L. REv. 1 (1988). As to public
advocacy, see, e.g., U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FEDERAL
REGULATION OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTs: THE MIXED RECORD OF THE 1980's (1993)
(MIXED RECORD); U.S. ADVISORY COM'N ON INrERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REGULATORY
FEDERALISM: POLICY, PROCESS, IMPACr AND REFORM (1984) (REGULATORY FEDERALISM).

15.

United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
RECORD, supra note 14; REGULATORY FEDERALISM, supra note

16. See generally MIXED
14.

17. See Kenneth J. Cooper & Helen Dewar, We're Halfway Done; TougherTests for House
Republican "Contract" Lie Ahead, WASH. PosT, Feb. 20, 1995, at Al; Michael K. Frisby,
Americans, Polled on GOP and "Contract," Like Big Picturebut Have Trouble with Small Print,
WALLSTREE J., Mar. 9, 1995, at A20.
18. STEPEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 70-80 (1993); STEPHEN BREYm,
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 278-79, 345, 362 (1982); Antonin Scalia, Subsidiarity a
l'Amriicaine: C'est a Dire Preemption, in MAASTRICHT, SUBSIDLARIIY AND ITALIAN-EC
RELATIONS 4 (The Mentor Group, The Forum

for U.S.-EC Legal-Economic Affairs, Venice, 1992).
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Community has been facing these problems very directly and deliberately
for well over a decade. With the 1996 IGC on the horizon, 19 and with
several more of these conferences scheduled, the Europeans are unlikely
to lose their focus on federalism anytime soon.

III.

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AS A LEGAL FRAME OF REFERENCE

The emergence of an EC frame of reference is scarcely limited to
federalism issues; it extends to other institutional issues and fully to
noninstitutional issues as well. U.S. policymakers have traditionally gone
about their business with a marked indifference to the policies of other
legal systems concerning the same or similar problems. They still exhibit
such indifference more than they should.
But the same broad
comparability that makes the European Community instructive to us on
federalism issues may also make it instructive on virtually any other
aspect of governance, including the law. I suspect that the European
Community may be in the process of becoming a generalized frame of
reference for U.S. policymakers (though by no means the only), just as
the United States has been for so long the measure (or, at least, a measure)
for other countries. If this is the case, it would represent a significant
change in U.S. legislative and regulatory attitude, and in my judgment a
healthy one. Whatever one's opinion of this development, it could not
realistically have occurred until the European Community had acquired
its present profile as a large and complex regulatory environment having
political, economic, and cultural characteristics clearly recognizable to us
in the United States.
Although the emergence of a EC frame of reference may be new
and important, it need not exclude the development of other more or less
bilateral-or even multilateral-frames of reference. Moreover, within
the U.S.-EC frame of reference, references properly run in two directions.
I shall once more take federalism as my initial example, but the point is a
decidedly more general one. Those who have been following European
Court of Justice (ECJ) case law on Article 30, concerning the elimination
of nontariff barriers to the free movement of goods, 20 know that that ECJ

19. See MAAsmHTcrr TREATY, supranote 1, art. N.
20. The EC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 30, forbids "[q]uantitative restrictions on imports
and all measures having equivalent effect." See generally Manfred A. Dauses, The System of the
FreeMovement of Goods in the European Community, 33 AM. J. ComP. L. 209 (1985); David T.
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has been in search of a new framework for dealing with these issues.
More particularly, they have been in search of a principled basis on which
to restrict an expansive and rather dogmatic jurisprudence on the subject.
However, the ECJ's most notable recent effort in that direction, the
judgment in the case of Keck and Mithouard,21 has itself been subject to
severe criticism as illogical and even simplistic. 22 I have found that at
least some EC officials, in Brussels and Luxembourg alike, believe that
U.S. Supreme Court decisions may be instructive in this regard. Though
far from unproblematic, the prevailing Supreme Court case law on the
"dormant" interstate commerce clause has taken the ECJ down quite
different, and in some ways more promising, avenues of analysis. There
appears to be at least some European interest in the idea, originating in the
Supreme Court's "dormant" commerce clause case law, that the clause
has no application at all in the absence of an actual and demonstrable
23
burden on interstate commerce.
The EC frame of reference applies to institutional issues
extending well beyond federalism as such. The IGC scheduled for 1996
will deal with the whole next generation of treaty amendments required
for the European Community's continued functioning into the next
century and, as noted,24 this is unlikely to be the last such conference.
The Commission has already determined, in preparation for the heavy
institutional agenda facing that IGC, to assemble a committee of foreign
experts to advise it on those issues and Americans are likely to be among
them. The Commission's position seems to be that the experts'
experiences in foreign countries may be useful to it. One example of such
an issue is the establishment within the European Community of
independent agencies that would function with greater or lesser
independence from the Commission and be able to capture the benefits of
Keeling, The FreeMovement of Goods in EECLaw: Basic Principlesand Recent Developments in
the Case Law of the Court ofJustice ofthe EuropeanCommunities, 26 INT'L LAW. 467 (1992).
21. Judgment of November 24, 1993 in Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268191 (not yet
officially published).
22. See A. Mattera, De l'arret "Dassonville" i l'arret "Keck": L'obscure Clart d'une
JurisprudenceRiche en PrincipesNovateurs et en Contradictions,1 REvuE o)u MARCHE UNIQuE
EUROPEEN 117 (1994); see also Note, 1 CoLuM. J. EuR. L. 120, 128 (1994-95).
23. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994); West Lynn
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114
S. Ct. 1677 (1994); Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Env. Quality, 114 S. Ct. 1345
(1994); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, 114 S. Ct. 855 (1994).
24. See MAAsrmcTrrETRATY supra note 1, art. N and accompanying text.
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greater expertise and efficiency. 25 There is good reason to suppose that
the 1996 IGC will find itself in a position to benefit from the American
experience with independent regulatory agencies, and with the various
instruments that the Executive Branch has devised over time to solve the
problems of coherence and coordination that such fragmentation of power
almost invariably raises.
Institutional questions, however, do not even begin to exhaust the
field over which the United States and the European Community have
become mutual frames of legal and policy reference. It was virtually
inconceivable that the European Community would develop and adopt a
directive on insider trading 26 without taking a long and careful look at
U.S. law and practice in that sphere. Conversely, the recently revived
initiative to enact uniform products liability legislation in the United
States is unlikely to proceed in ignorance of the 1985 EC directive
harmonizing the Member States' legislation on products liability.27
Countless other examples exist. They all suggest that the United States
and the European Community are actually in a position to carry out the
largest and most ambitious exercise in law reform by the comparative
method that the world has ever seen, if they choose to do so.
IV.

INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COOPERATION

From this conclusion, it is a relatively small step to envisage a
veritable program of international regulatory cooperation between the
United States and the European Community.
By "international
regulatory cooperation," I mean the process by which U.S. federal
25. See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Casefor a Cartel Body: Europa, FIN. TMES, Mar. 7,
1995, at 14; Simon Kuper, Drug Agency Will Draw Companies, FN. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1995, at 8;
Caroline Monnot, Les Enjeux du Tiliphonedu Futur: UneAutoritgEuropenne?,LEMONDE, July
14, 1994, at 16; Craig R. Whitney, With European Union's Arrival Fears on Economy Cast a
Shadow, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 30, 1993, at 1, col. 1.
26. Council Directive 89/592/EEC of Nov. 13, 1989, coordinating regulations on insider
trading, 1989 OJ. (L 334) 30. See generally Barbara Crutchfield George, Maria Kathleen Boss &
Marty Haraldson, The European Community DirectiveRegulating Insider Trading: Harmonizing
Difficultiesforthe UnitedStates, 22 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 257 (1993); Thomas Lee Hazen, Defining
Illegal Insider Trading: Lessonsfrom the European Community Directive on Insider Trading, 55
LAW& Cowi w. PRoBS. 231 (1992).
27. Council Directive 85/374/EEC of July 25, 1985, on the laws, regulations and
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products, 1985
OJ. (L 210) 29. On current U.S. products liability initiatives at the federal level, see Stephen
Labaton, G.O.P. PreparingBill to OverhaulNegligence Law, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 19, 1995, at 1.
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agencies and the European Commission directorates-general conduct
their respective regulatory activities through various forms of
collaboration with the other.28 In a growing number of fields-aviation,
food and drug, and telecommunications, for example-departments or
agencies of the U.S. government are in fact engaging in collaborative
regulatory activities with their EC counterparts. 29 Such initiatives may be
prompted by a variety of considerations. Regulators observe that they
face similar problems and stand to benefit from sharing information,
research and experience in addressing them. Moreover, by making their
regulatory standards fairly common, national officials place themselves in
a position to take mutual advantage of each other's enforcement activities
and resources. 30 Finally, private industry ordinarily prefers to operate in
a reasonably uniform regulatory environment of the sort that international
regulatory cooperation may be capable of producing; it may find as a
result that the overall cost of conducting multinational business is
lowered.
On the other hand, intensive regulatory collaboration raises
difficult political, legal, and administrative problems. Assuming that it
goes beyond the mere exchange of views or of documentary material,
collaboration can considerably complicate the usual regulatory process. It
may introduce criteria that are foreign to the usual domestic
Collaboration may also complicate regulation
administration.
procedurally, for example, by reducing the degree of transparency or the
forms of public participation that are possible. When two or more nations
collaborate in regulation, they may in any event find themselves operating
more in the mode of negotiation than lawmaking. The more substantive
question also arises of whether the participating nations should seek an
accommodation between their standards, settle for something more in the
nature of a lowest common denominator, or possibly pursue the highest
possible standard of protection. Harmonization inevitably raises the

28. See George A. Bermann, Regulatory Cooperationwith CounterpartAgencies Abroad:
The FAA Aircraft Certification Erperience, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 669 (1993);
ADMINIsTRATIVE CONFERENCE OFTHEUNrTED STATES 1991 ANN. REP. 63 etseq.

29.
ECONOMIC

IrNi

Id.

On international regulatory cooperation generally, see ORGANISATION FOR

CO-OPERATION

AND

DEVELOPMENT,

REGULATORY

CO-OPERATION

PENDENT WoRLD (1994).
30. George A. Bermann, Managing Regulatory Rapprochement:

FOR

AN

Institutional and

ProceduralApproaches, in REGuLATORY Co-OPERATION FOR AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD, supra

note 29, at 73.
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issues of whether uniformity or merely convergence is required, and the
extent to which local differences and local preferences can justifiably be
suppressed in the interest of having comnmon standards and procedures. 3 1
In sum, international regulatory cooperation, though highly
promising, is problematic in that it risks distorting both prevailing policies
and procedures. To that extent, it necessarily raises questions of
democratic legitimacy and democratic accountability. My aim here is not
to explore either the promises or the pitfalls of international regulatory
cooperation, 32 but rather to underscore that the reciprocal involvement of
the United States and the European Community in each other's regulatory
processes has lent their legal relationship still another new and important
nontransactional dimension.
V.

CONCLUSION

My remarks thus far are meant to convey my enthusiasm over the
unveiling of new horizons for the U.S.-EC legal relationship. That
relationship seems poised to transcend the boundaries of transactional
law, such as competition, trade and transnational litigation law, which
have very largely defined U.S. interest in EC law and legal developments.
But even if I have correctly identified and characterized the elements of
change, I may be mistaken in applauding them. Let me raise, in a final
series of remarks, what seem to me to be the most salient objections to
my characterization and evaluation of the trends.
First, the very distinction between the transactional and the
nontransactional may be called into question. At the very least, this
distinction calls to mind a more conventional, and often discredited,

31. See John Braithwaite, Prospects for Win-Win International Rapprochement of
Regulation, in REGULATORY Co-OPERATION FOR AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD, supra note 29, at
201; Scott H. Jacobs, Regulatory Co-operation for an Interdependent World: Issues for
Government, in REGULATORY Co-OPERATION FOR AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD, supra note 29, at
15; Giandomenico Majone, ComparingStrategiesof Regulatory Rapprochement, in REGULATORY
CO-OPERATION FOR AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD, supra note 29, at 155; James K Martin & Alan
Painter, Seeking Mutual Gain: Strategies for Expanding Regulatory Co-operation, in
REGULATORY Co-OPERATION FOR AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD, supra note 29, at 93; Jacques
Pelkmans & Jeanne-Mey Sun, Towards a European Community Regulatoy Strategy: Lessons
from "Learning-by-Doing," in REGULATORY Co-OPERATION FOR AN INTERDEPENDENr WORLD,
supranote 29, at 179.
32. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supranote 29.

TULANE J. OF INT'L & COMP.LAW

[Vol. 4

distinction between private and public law. 33 Arguably, what I have
shown is merely that the public law side of the U.S.-EC legal relationship
has grown in importance along with the public side of the law generally,
to the relative detriment of traditional private law. In each of the
scenarios that I described above, government regulators essentially
occupy center stage, whether borrowing from the other side in the
reshaping of their law or engaging in direct regulatory coordination in
pursuit of a more common regulatory environment. Some might criticize
my apparent preoccupation with these aspects of the modem regulatory
state and my apparent neglect of the EC law subjects that bear most
directly on private commercial behavior: corporate, tax, and contract law,
as well as more specialized business law topics. This objection, however,
suffers from the same flaw that has come to discredit the sharp distinction
between public and private law. Even those legal regimes that we most
closely associate with private economic activity, such as corporate, tax,
and contract law, form part of the overall regulatory environment.
Conversely, business is governed as fully by enactments of the regulatory
state as by traditional private law sources.
Second, the comparative and collaborative activities that I have
identified proceed on the premise that the United States and European
Community are not profoundly different as legal environments. But in
fact they do represent important differences. For example, the United
States is a two-centuries old federation whose constituent units had had
relatively little experience in self-government prior to forming a union. It
is characterized by an exceedingly high level of mobility. It occupies a
culturally and linguistically unified landscape. By contrast, the European
Community has had to contend with Member States that have had long
and successful experiences with political independence, that retain strong
cultural and linguistic particularities, and whose populations are
correspondingly less mobile. As the European Community expands

33. On this distinction, see Randy E. Barnett, Foreward: FourSenses of the PublicLawPrivateLaw Distinction,9 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 267 (1986); Alan David Freeman & Elizabeth
Mensch, The Public-PrivateDistinctionin American Law andLife, 36 BuFF. L. REV. 237 (1987);
Jonathan Hill, PublicLaw and PrivateLaw: More (French)Foodfor Thought, 1985 Pun. L. 14
(1985); L. Harold Levinson, The Public Law/Private Law Distinction in the Courts, 57 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 1579 (1989); Alfred P. Rubin, Private and Public History: Private and Public Law,
82 ASIL Proceedings 30 (1990); Charles Sampford, Law, Institutions and the Public/Private
Divide, 20 FED. L. Rnv. 185 (1992); Harry Woolf, PublicLaw-PrivateLaw: Why the Divide? A
PersonalView, 1986 PUB. L. 220.
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eastward, its relative heterogeneity in these and other respects may only
become more pronounced.
Perhaps because of its well-defined territorial distinctions, the EC
has thus far behaved in accordance with the view that geographical
criteria count heaviest in determining the structure and organization of
political power. Overall political trends in the United States, well
illustrated in the outcome of the fall 1994 congressional elections, suggest
that the salient political lines in the United States are not geographical but
rather socio-economic ones. In the very long term, the European
Community will probably develop political lines that are as fully socioeconomic as they are territorial. Yet, until it does, policy comparisons
with the United States will be dangerous.
Finally, even if the European Community provides an apt frame
of reference for U.S. law, as well as a suitable partner in regulatory
cooperation, the further question remains whether it is in itself a sufficient
one. The twenty-first century will be one in which other regional
groupings present themselves for consideration more forcefully than ever
Those groupings will do so
in these nontransactional respects.
differently, depending on the issues at hand and the changes taking place
within the groupings themselves. The United States is, at the same time,
situating itself within an altered North American regional environment.
This fact cannot help but affect the continued suitability of a EC legal
frame of reference for the United States and challenge the European
Community's currently privileged position in U.S. regulatory
cooperation.
Because the European Community's preeminence in these
respects will be subject to competition and other stresses in the period
ahead is not, however, a reason to minimize the changes in the U.S.
conception of EC law that I have described. It has been one thing to
consult European law (or indeed any foreign law) for purposes of
designing, executing, and "mopping up" after international transactions.
It is quite another thing to enlist that law in the analytical and critical
challenges facing the U.S. legal system more generally. The current U.S.
perspective on EC law has already made that transition.

